Deicing Omission Led To Embraer Phenom 300 Crash in Utah

The pilot’s failure to deice an Embraer Phenom 300 and activate the aircraft’s wing and stabilizer anti-ice system led to an aerodynamic stall and fatal crash seconds after takeoff from Utah's Provo Airport (KPVU) on Jan. 2, 2023, according to the NTSB’s final report. The pilot flying, who held an airline transport pilot certificate, was killed. Two of the three passengers were seriously injured and one sustained minor injuries.

Shortly after rotation, the aircraft entered a steep nose-up attitude and immediately rolled left, hitting the runway and terrain beside it. A witness described seeing the left wing strike the runway first.

According to witnesses, the twinjet had been parked outside for approximately 40 minutes before the accident, in misty rain and light snow, after being pulled from a heated hangar. Witnesses observed visible water droplets on both wings during fueling, but the aircraft was not deiced or anti-iced before departure. The airplane, registered as N555NR, was being operated as a Part 91 personal flight.

Before departure, the pilot had asked about deicing but took no further action after learning that the FBO’s truck was inoperable. Although advised to contact a second FBO with a functioning deicing truck, the pilot did not follow through.

The Phenom was equipped with a wing and horizontal stabilizer anti-icing system designed to remove and prevent ice accumulation on the leading edges of the wing and horizontal stabilizer. However, investigators determined that while the “Wing Stab” anti-ice switch was activated during engine runup, it was shut off minutes later, and “the recorded position of the Wing Stab system switch remained off through the remainder of the recorded data,” the report stated.

Verbalized checklist items were captured by the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) as the pilot started each engine and the anti-ice switches were commanded on, and then off again during the process. The Wing Stab switch was commanded off, which was verbalized by the pilot, and remained off throughout the takeoff sequence. A “click” sound was recorded by the CVR after the switch was turned off.

The NTSB noted that the airplane’s pilot operating handbook (POH) explicitly requires that “airplane surfaces contaminated by ice, frozen precipitation, or frost must be deiced before departure” and that anti-icing “must be used when the risk of freezing precipitation exists or is actually taking place.” Further, the NTSB noted that “while deicing removes ice, anti-icing protects against additional icing for a certain period of time.”

Temperature and dew point were both -1 degrees C at the time of the accident, indicating that freezing precipitation was present. This was confirmed by witnesses, including a worker who was clearing snow on the ramp, who mentioned that the snowfall quickly covered areas he had cleared. IMC prevailed, with six miles of visibility and an overcast ceiling at 800 feet.

Further, the NTSB noted that the POH instructs that the entire upper wing surface must be visually inspected before takeoff, not just the leading edge or wingtip. Investigators found no evidence that the pilot performed such an inspection or requested one from trained personnel, either on the CVR or from witnesses.

Data from the aircraft’s flight recorders confirmed a stall warning sounded at 11:35:53 a.m.—just seconds after the airplane had left the ground. Within five seconds, the aircraft rolled left, and the nose struck terrain. 

An examination of the accident site found that the airplane hit the runway about 2,626 feet from the approach end of Runway 13 and about 20 feet left of the runway centerline. A scrape mark extended about 91 feet and was parallel to the runway centerline, according to the NTSB.

There was a second scrape mark about 2,903 feet from the approach end of Runway 13 that arced left to the left edge of the runway surface about 3,126 feet from the approach end of the runway. Finally, a swath of displaced snow and dirt extended from the runway’s left edge about 100 feet to an impact crater.

This crater contained portions of airframe debris and various airframe components, the NTSB said. Wreckage debris extended from the crater about 597 feet to the fuselage. The wings were separated from the airframe and were located about 106 feet beyond the fuselage. Both engines were separated and located adjacent to the fuselage.

“The pilot’s failure to deice the airplane and activate the wing and stabilizer anti-ice system prior to takeoff in freezing precipitation” was cited as the probable cause of the accident by the NTSB. The report concluded that the resulting ice accumulation “led to an aerodynamic stall and loss of control.”

Even brief exposure to freezing precipitation can create hazardous surface contamination, the NTSB noted, and anti-ice systems must be actively used when conditions warrant. The Phenom 300 was substantially damaged in the crash. No indication of mechanical failure is contained in the NTSB report, reinforcing that environmental conditions and human factors were central to the cause.